Three Criteria for Constitutional Interpretation: Predictability, Flexibility and Intelligibility by Lines, Patricia M.
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 4
Issue 3 Symposium on Religion Clauses Article 8
February 2014
Three Criteria for Constitutional Interpretation:
Predictability, Flexibility and Intelligibility
Patricia M. Lines
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Patricia M. Lines, Three Criteria for Constitutional Interpretation: Predictability, Flexibility and Intelligibility, 4 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics
& Pub. Pol'y 549 (1990).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol4/iss3/8
THREE CRITERIA FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: PREDICTABILITY,
FLEXIBILITY AND INTELLIGIBILITY
PATRICIA M. LINES*
My assigned task is to comment on the papers of Profes-
sors Smith and Esbeck. My response is only partial, for there is
much in these two very different papers that could be
applauded or criticized and too little space to do it; but this
response also takes broader aim at some fundamental
problems found in most efforts to interpret the clause in the
first amendment forbidding Congress from passing a "law
respecting the establishment of religion . . . ." I propose three
criteria for evaluation of such efforts: predictability, flexibility
and intelligibility. The Court's own effort fails on all three cri-
teria, as does most of the commentary from the legal
profession.
Predictability and flexibility have long ago won secure
positions in the literature and case law as ultimate goals for
judicial decisions. Predictability, generally secured by adher-
ence to precedent, is "required for the ordering of human
affairs over the course of time and a basis of 'public faith in the
judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judge-
ments.' "' But, as Justice Frankfurter warned, in an oft-quoted
passage: "[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, how-
ever recent and questionable, when such adherence involves
collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope,
intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience." 2
Predictability means following the plain meaning of a pro-
vision; taking pains to construe it as it was intended by the
drafters; and following the rules of precedent. Flexibility does
not mean corruption of the meaning of the original text, how-
ever; it means avoidance of overly rigid adherence to precedent
where it will work a manifestly unjust or an unmanageable
* Visiting Professor of Education, Haynes Chair, Catholic University of
America. J.D., 1963, University of Minnesota.
1. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 127 (1970) (Harlan,J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part) (quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970)).
2. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
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result. The conflict between the two can be harmonized by
placing on the courts responsibility strictly to adhere to its own
precedent, except where a legislature or a jury has appropri-
ately logged in on the opposite side of the issue.3 That is,
courts appropriately achieve flexibility by deferring to more
democratically constituted bodies.
Intelligibility does not receive much attention in case law
or law reviews. Its defense rests upon the rather simple idea
that the Constitution belongs to everyone, not just lawyers and
judges. Principles of democratic participation fundamental to
the Constitution argue against a narrow specialty of "constitu-
tional law" that is off-limits to the interested member of the
public because of the vast scholarship required to deal with it.
It is achieved, in part, by attention to universal values and
broadly applicable rules. For example, if the Court must ascer-
tain the intent of a written enactment, the same rules ought to
apply - if they make any sense at all - regardless of whether it
is the intent of the drafters of the first amendment, the intent of
Congress in passing a law, the hidden intent to racially discrim-
inate, or the intent courts search for when determining whether
a law violates the establishment clause. Finally, intelligibility
may also be a matter of good manners - eschewing jargon,
and considering the layman's position.
Presumably in an effort to enhance predictability, and per-
haps intelligibility, the Court has formulated a test that a stat-
ute must pass in order to pass constitutional muster. Such a
test is supposed to guide the Court and others when deciding
how constitutional values are to apply to a given set of facts.
To serve this end, the test itself should be rooted in the lan-
guage of the provision being interpreted and, only where the
language is ambiguous, in legislative history.4 Of course, the
application of the test should follow the rules of precedent.
The Supreme Court's test for violations of the establishment
clause fails each criterion in this test for principled
adjudication.
To begin, the very development of the test was a break
with precedent. At one time, the Court decided these cases on
the basis of a general principle of neutrality: "[The first
amendment] requires the state to be ... neutral in its relations
3. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
4. Where the meaning of a provision is clear, "reliance on legislative
history is misplaced." Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 109 S. Ct.
2854, 2864 (1989). See also Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 109 S. Ct.
1500, 1504 n.3 (1989) ("Legislative history is irrelevant to the interpretation
of an unambiguous statute").
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with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers .... State
power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it
is to favor them." 5  Purpose was important; the general rule
did not cover laws "whose reason or effect merely happens to
coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all reli-
gions." 6 Abington School District v. Schempp began the construc-
tion of a more elaborate test, taking up the language about
what was not covered to articulate a positive, two-pronged test
of intent and impact: "to withstand the strictures of the Estab-
lishment Clause[,] there must be a secular legislative purpose
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion." 7 Schempp then became authority for the school aid
cases .
8
The idea of entanglement was introduced in Walz v. Tax
Commission, upholding property tax exemptions for churches.'
The entanglement language first appeared to explain what was
not covered by the test: the Court ruled that a failure to extend
tax exemptions to churches could violate the principle of neu-
trality.'° Once again, however, the explanation of what was not
covered was transformed into a part of the test, and the Court
voided certain aid programs to private schools because of
entangling provisions in the administration of the program."
It is difficult to explain the entanglement criterion in the origi-
nal terms of neutrality except where the interaction of church
and state is so intimate that the government is forced to aban-
don its neutral position. But in such cases, the entanglement
prong is unnecessary. Entanglement has come to imply any
close cooperation, however careful the state is to maintain
neutrality.
After a number of years of experience with the three-part
test, a large number of commentators have noted that it fails as
a device for permitting easy prediction of cases.' 2 The Court
itself has freely admitted the problem:
5. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
6. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
7. 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (striking down prayers and Bible reading in
public school). Note that the more complex test was unnecessary in this case,
as the Court could easily find prayer and bible reading less than neutral.
8. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
9. 397 U'S. 664 (1970).
10. Id. at 674.
11. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
12. Buchanan, Government Aid to Sectarian Schools: A Study in Corrosive
Precedents, 15 Hous. L. REV. 783, 783-84, 788 (1978); Choper, The Religion
Clause of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prr. L. REV. 673,
680-81 (1980); Marty, Of Darters and Schools and Clergymen: The Religion Clauses
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What is certain is that our decisions have tended to avoid
categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches at
either end of the range of possible outcomes. This
course sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility,
but this promises to be the case until the continuing
interaction between the courts and the States - the for-
mer charged with interpreting and upholding the Consti-
tution and the latter seeking to provide education for
their youth - produces a single, more encompassing
construction of the Establishment Clause.' 3
This admission has drawn deserved criticism. Professor
Choper has called it the Court's "euphemism. . . for expressly
admitting the absence of any principled rational for its prece-
dent."' 4 Justice Scalia finds it "embarrassing" enough that he
would abandon the test.' 5
Assuming that flexibility is a goal, it should not be used to
enhance some subjective goal of the Court, or to excuse it from
its duty of principled adjudication, but to defer in some consis-
tent way to democratic institutions. While the above passage is
from a case in which the criterion is properly invoked - the
Court upheld a state law allowing private schools cash reim-
bursement for costs of meeting mandated state testing require-
ments - there are a large number of other cases where the
Court has refused to be flexible.' 6 In short, the Court has
invoked the criterion of flexibility to avoid dealing with the
incongruities of its own precedent.
With neither predictability nor flexibility served, the test
fails. The failure is exacerbated by the failure of the Court on
the third criteria proposed here: intelligibility. A serious prob-
lem arises when persons untrained in constitutional law
attempt to understand the test. The Court has so utterly failed
Worse Confounded, 1978 S. CT. REV. 171, 190; Note, Public Aid to Private Schools:
Committeefor Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 34 Sw. L.J. 1261, 1271
(1981).
13. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646, 662 (1980). See also Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 761 n.5 (1973).
14. Choper, supra note 12, at 681.
15. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639-40 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). See also Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting, citing the same passage from Regan).
16. The Court's claim to flexibility fails when one considers the two
recent cases forbidding use of public school teachers on private school
premises. See generally Lines, The Entanglement Prong of the Establishment Clause
and the Needy Child in the Private School: Is Distributive Justice Possible?, 17 J.L. &
EDUC. 1 (1988).
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to explain itself that it is constantly misunderstood and miscon-
strued, encouraging widespread abuse of its principles. The
distorted application of the Court's test provides convincing
evidence that it is unintelligible to average citizens. To take
some examples:
* , Publishers of public school texts routinely censor reli-
gious references from classic works.17
* A school book editor deleted the words "God,"
"Bible," "Jews," "Sukkos," and "Tabernacle" and a
key topic sentence, "The Pilgrims got the idea for
Thanksgiving from Jews like Molly and her mama,"
from Barbara Cohen's prizewinning story "Molly's
Pilgrim" gutting the heart of the story. Cohen fought
back, but the final version was not much improved.' 8
" An Alabama high school has for years offered a social
studies class on comparative religion. Midway into
the year the course was abruptly cancelled.' 9
* Public school libraries have refused donated books
that have religious content, or that, in some cases,
simply take a position that is sometimes associated
with a religious point of view. 20
* Student distribution of Bibles has been prohibited in
some public schools; so has distribution of pro-life
literature, despite constitutional principles that
uphold the rights of students in school to distribute
literature subject to reasonable rules as to time and
place.2 '
17. For example, a story by Nobel laureate Isaac Bashevis Singer,
"Zlateh the Goat," tells of a boy, lost in a blizzard, who prays "to God" for
himself and his goat, lost with him. In an edited version appearing in the
Macmillan Grade 6 reader, CATCH THE WIND, the boy prays, but the phrase
"to God" is deleted. When the boy is rescued, Singer's sentence, "Thank
God that in the hay it was not cold," is changed to "Thank Goodness .... "
18. Cohen, Censoring the Sources, SCHOOL LIBR. J., Mar. 1989, at 99.
19. Letter from Charlene Jones (the teacher of the course) to Dr.
Nicholas Piediscalzi, President of the NCRPE (Apr. 22, 1987).
20. Telephone interview with Jordan Lawrence, attorney at Concerned
Women of America, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 2, 1987). Lawrence donated
F.A. SCHAEFFER and C.E. Koop, WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE HUMAN RACE?
(1979) to a school library, but it was initially refused.
21. In Florida, a girl who gave a book report on the New Testament
and distributed copies to friends was hauled off to the principal's office. All
copies of the New Testament were confiscated, including her personal copy.
She was told that she could not quote the Bible in her book report. In other
districts, students have been in big trouble for giving friends copies of the
Bible as Christmas presents. Telephone interview with Tom Parker (Dec. 1,
1987).
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* Individuals who would include attention to religion
clauses in the first amendment in teacher workshops
or other seminars are often told to avoid such
material.22
* A child in Oklahoma, caught bowing his head to pray
before taking the math section of a standardized test
was taken to the principal's office and ordered to write
"I will not pray in class" 500 times.23
Empirical research has demonstrated that these anecdotal
cases are the rule, not the exception. Comprehensive' reviews
of public school texts reveal a strong tendency to avoid even a
mention of contemporary religious thought or activity, leaving
a message that the good society is profoundly secular. In the
most well-known of these studies, New York University profes-
sor Paul Vitz examined 60 elementary school social studies
texts and 22 basal readers. 24 He found that none of the
approximately 15,000 pages in 60 books examined had even
one written reference to primary religious activity in contemporary
American life. Secondary religious references (e.g., a picture of
a church or a map that includes the site of a church) to contem-
porary American life were also rare.2 5
Some scholars 26 were prepared to dismiss these findings
based upon a presumption that the ideological bias of the
22. C. HAYNES, TEACHING ABOUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1985). A
condensed version can be found in Haynes, Forgetting Our First Freedom:
Religious Liberty and the Social Studies Curriculum, 13 RELIGION & PUB. EDUC. 57
(1986).
23. Telephone interview with B.F. O'Neal, attorney for the child, in
Shreveport, La. (Mar. 10, 1987).
24. Vitz examined all social studies texts adopted by the two major
powers in textbook selections, Texas and California, with all those adopted in
Georgia and Florida thrown in for good measure. Vitz estimated that these
books represented an estimated 70 to 75% of all such texts used in public
schools throughout the country, based upon an examination of the frequency
with which they were selected by all 22 states having a statewide adoption
process for texts. The 22 basal readers for grades 3 and 6 represented all the
basal readers approved in California and Texas.
25. Vitz, "Equity in Values Education: Do the Values Education
Aspects of Public School Curricula Deal Fairly with Diverse Belief Systems?"
NIE Grant: NIE-G84-0012 (Project No. 2-0099) (July 15, 1985). It has been
republished in P.C. VITZ, CENSORSHIP: EVIDENCE OF BIAS IN OUR CHILDREN'S
TEXTBOOKS (1986); Religion and Traditional Values in Public School Textbooks, 84
THE PUB. INTEREST 79 (1986); The Role of Religion in Public School Textbooks, 13
RELIGION & PUB. EDUC. 48 (1986). See also R. BRYAN, HISTORY, PSEUDO-
HISTORY, ANTI-HISTORY: How PUBLIC-SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS TREAT RELIGION
(1985).
26. See, e.g., McDermott, The Treatment of Religion in School Textbooks: A
Political Analysis and a Modest Proposal, 13 RELIGION & PUB. EDUC. 62 (1986).
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researchers tainted the work, but this became impossible fol-
lowing two additional studies by organizations with the oppo-
site ideological bias. Americans United Research Foundation
examined United States history, government, and civics text-
books, and found that "religious freedom" and "church-state
separation" were topics that were largely ignored. While the
general bias of Americans United would lead it to stress the
constitutional treatment of religion, and not religion itself, the
study also acknowledged the failure to present anything on the
positive role of the Judaeo-Christian heritage: "there is little or
nothing about . . . the significant religious 'awakenings,' the
struggles of minority faiths, the religious motivation of immi-
grants, and other related themes central to a proper under-
standing of American history."27 People for the American Way
(PAW) has also very generously and appropriately acknowl-
edged the problem. The organization was near completion of a
review of major United States history textbooks undertaken for
other purposes. Recognizing the importance of the Vitz find-
ings, PAW reviewed the books to see how they treated religion.
In the preface to its report, Anthony Podesta, PAW's executive
director, reports:
Religion is simply not treated as a significant ele-
ment in American life - it is not portrayed as an iite-
grated part of the American value system or as something
that is important to individual Americans. The two
themes which have been in tension since the earliest colo-
nial times - religious intolerance and religious idealism
- are not recognized as essential to an understanding of
the American character. 28
It seems the public needs more intelligible guidance from
the Court, and if not the Court, from academic apologists for
the Court. The two papers offered here do not really resolve
the problem. Professor Esbeck reviews the chaos in current
establishment clause jurisprudence but ends by lamely defend-
ing it. Professor Smith proposes a new standard, although he
declines to call it such; and we do not really know how it will
apply in the myriad situations where the establishment clause
may be relevant.
Professor Esbeck's defense makes an already complicated
matter more complicated. For example, when discussing the
27. C. HAYNES, supra note 22, at 57.
28. O.L. DAVIS, G. PONDER, L.M. BURLBAW, M. GARZA-LUBECK, & A.
Moss, LOOKING AT HISTORY: A REVIEW OF MAJOR U.S. HISTORY TEXTBOOKS 3
(1986).
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Court's test for intent, he confuses the individual purpose, or
motive, of individual legislators with the official purpose of the
enactment - the collective purpose motivating the legislature
as a whole.2 9 Second, he appears to consider the Court's defer-
ence to legislative bodies a unique aspect of adjudication under
the establishment clause."0 As already noted, this is a normal
way of achieving flexibility in adjudication. There are other
good reasons for doing so as well, mostly relating to the
Court's proper concept of its own function and principles relat-
ing to a separation of powers in government. Professor
Esbeck's apparent discomfort over what he calls "highly defer-
ential inquiry" is the Court's normal rule, not an exception
developed for the purpose of the establishment clause. Esbeck
adds to the general confusion in asserting that the Supreme
Court once had used "political divisiveness" as part of its test
for establishment;" it was never really clear that a majority of
the Court adopted this language as a part of its test. 32 Finally,
29. Esbeck asserts that the Court is "not abandoning motive-analysis
altogether" in decisions under the establishment clause. Esbeck, The Lemon
Test. Should It Be Retained, Reformulated or Rejected?, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'v 513, 517 (1990). He fails, however, to offer any real support for
the view that a majority is engaging in motive analysis at all. In fact, much
later in his article, he correctly notes that the search for purpose is a search
for "objective purpose." Id. at 536.
Esbeck also suggests that the Court avoids "motive analysis" when
adjudicating other provisions of the Constitution. This needs clarifying. In
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), the Court made it clear that it
would not inquire into individual motivation when the official purpose of an
enactment is unambiguous. The Court upheld the closing of a swimming
pool, refusing to consider off the record evidence that avoidance of an
integration order motivated the decision, despite a challenge under the equal
protection clause. Official purpose nonetheless remains the test in such
cases. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (purpose and not
disproportionate impact determines validity of employment test). See also
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) (refusal to rezone upheld, despite disproportionate exclusion of
lower income residents and minorities). The same distinctions apply to
adjudication under the establishment clause.
Justice Scalia also may be confusing individual motive and legislative
purpose, when he engages in a diatribe on the vagaries ofjudging a statute by
legislative motive. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987)
(Scalia,J., dissenting). It is possible, however, that Scalia is only accusing the
majority of deciding that case on the basis of "subjective motivation" rather
than official purpose. Scalia freely admits that it is possible to discern the
"objective 'purpose' of a statute." Id. at 636.
30. Esbeck, supra note 29, at 516.
31. Id. at 528.
32. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971), the Court said
"political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against
COMMENTARY
Esbeck's discussion of the role of "inherently religious" institu-
tions, laws, and other items is needlessly confusing. The term
is a term of art only when applied to institutions, but Esbeck
seems to make it a term of art applicable to laws and policies as
well.
On the other hand, Professor Esbeck does a very nice job
of exposing the inconsistencies in the Court's application of its
test for impermissible effects when it is dealing with parochial
schools, compared to all other occasions."3 After such a devas-
tating demonstration of the foibles of the Court's approach, it
is all the more puzzling that he concludes by defending the sta-
tus quo.
Professor Smith's analysis argues for more flexibility for
the Court, rather than for legislators, in dealing with the estab-
lishment clause, but he bases this argument on the intent of the
framers of the first amendment to keep the language flexible.
This analysis retains respect for the wording of the amendment
- the first point of inquiry in determining the intent of an
enactment. However, even if the history he cites may convince
one that the drafters intended a flexible meaning, he must still
make a case that they intended the Court to wield its power
without deference to legislatures. Moreover, as I think Profes-
sor Smith would agree, the language still restrains interpreta-
tion: one cannot, for example, construe "establishment" to
mean "accommodation," without violating some very basic
rules of interpretation. In general, I find Smith's analysis help-
ful, although what he calls a principle of nonpreferentialism, I
prefer to call a principle of neutrality, for this is the language
that the Court itself at one time endorsed.3"
Somewhat troublesome is the vagueness with which Pro-
fessor Smith presents his "liberty maximizing" principle. In
particular, this principle fails to resolve the case where the lib-
erty of two opposing groups of citizens are pitted against each
other - an often unavoidable situation where public schools
which the first amendment was intended to protect." In Committee for Pub.
Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973) it said
that "the prospect ... of divisiveness may not alone warrant the invalidation
of state laws," and called it a "warning signal." See also Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 365 n. 15 (1975). Reviewing this meandering line, Professor Choper
has concluded that it was unclear whether political divisiveness was an
independent test, a warning signal or merely supportive rhetoric. Choper,
supra note 12, at 683.
33. Esbeck, supra note 29, at 521, 528.
34. It also avoids the creation of new "isms," needlessly adding to the
jargon of constitutional law.
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present, as they must, value-laden curricular material. I refer
to material that is not religious, but which many groups address
with strong religious referents. In such cases, public officials
must choose sides, that is, they must prefer one or the other, or
abandon the value-laden curriculum. The question, then, is:
Whose liberty is to be maximized? It is not enough to assume,
as Professor Smith seems to assume, that legislation is always
oppressive and therefore judicial invalidation of it is always a
step toward maximizing liberty. Indeed, to take another exam-
ple, legislatures may intend to secure liberty and equal oppor-
tunity for the disadvantaged, by allowing them the same
freedom as those who can afford to choose their education or
other services from the institution they prefer.
Second, I quite frankly do not see how Professor Smith's
liberty-maximizing principle can explain the Court's stringent
approach in the school aid cases, where children who cannot
afford anything else are forced to attend secular, public
schools. Aptly-named compulsory education laws supply the
coercion. State and federal efforts to remedy the impact of the
coercion are neutral to religion. Yet, most of them fail the
Court's test. Professor Smith's analysis simply does not even
speak to cases of this sort, let alone guide us toward a better
way to predict their outcome.
While it is of course true that broad general principles
underlie the first amendment, widely varying, specific cases
must nonetheless be decided. A general principle of neutrality
toward religion - including sincere conscientious beliefs in the
definition of religion - is closer to the broad and general
phrasing of the religion clauses than is the Court's intricate
three-pronged test. But its vagueness led the Court to search
for a more specific set of rules. The task remains, however, of
shaping these rules in an intelligible manner.
